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PERSPECTIVES AND OBSTACLES OF THE SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM IMPLEMENTATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF CIVIL AND COMMON LAW SYSTEMS
Khurram Raja*, Alex Kostyuk**
Abstract
The paper outlines shareholder activism development in common law and civil law countries and
identifies features of these legal systems that create preconditions and obstacles for shareholder
activism. Our findings show that tendencies of shareholder activism depend on the type of the legal
system, but also vary within the countries that share the same legal system. Thus, we conclude that the
type of legal system is not the chief determinant of shareholder activism. A comparative analysis of
shareholder activism in Germany and Ukraine (civil law countries) and the USA and the UK (common
law countries) shows that the system of domestic corporate regulation, development of the stock
market, companies’ capitalization and corporate governance influence the development of shareholder
activism in equal measure.
JEL topics: G34, K22, G23
Keywords: Shareholder Activism, Common Law, Civil Law, Hedge Funds, Corporate Governance
* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Zayed University, Dubai, UAE
** Professor, Department of International Economics, Ukrainian Academy of Banking, Chairman, Virtus Global Center for
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1 Introduction
Shareholder activism is the issue that gains
controversial feedback in academic and business
circles. It is the way in which shareholders can assert
their power as owners of the company to influence its
behaviour. In some cases shareholder activism is
directed against other large shareholders, not against
directors. There may also be cases of collaborative
shareholder activism, in particular when it is
conducted in private.
There has been witnessed a new wave of interest
in shareholder activism in recent years. Supporters of
this phenomenon argue that companies with active
and engaged shareholders are more likely to be
successful in the long term compared to companies
without such insistent owners. Adversaries of
shareholder activism proclaim it a disruptive populist
ranting that weakens strong companies.
There is no agreement on the level of power that
shareholders should delegate to boards of directors
and the proper time for shareholders to impose direct
actions. Worldwide practice and existing legal
framework suggest that shareholder activism is
majorly developed in Anglo-Saxon countries with a
common law system, where individual and
institutional investors seem to have more levers of
influence on the corporations and boards of directors.
On the other hand, the recent research suggests that

countries with the civil law system allow more
shareholder activism that makes investors less
reluctant to influence development of the
corporations. At the same time, the nature of activism
is changing in the United States. There is heightened
interest in new activism players – like hedge funds –
and new tactics they use such as derivatives dealing
and stock lending.
A particular number of firms and individuals
have been connected to this type of activity for
decades. Although when shareholder activism came
into existence such activity was often charged with
corporate raider label. Activist companies and
individuals took advantage of their own funds to buy
stocks in the company and proceed with the internal
contest for the overall control over the board. Later on
new methods and players came into existence. Funds
collected from other investors got the upper hand over
the personal funds in shareholder activism. This
increased the scale of the issue and power of the
engaged parties. Moreover, activists switched their
attention from gaining board majority to influencing
corporate strategy by one or two seats on the board.
Modern activists still view company breakup as the
potential outcome of their activity, but such results as
change of the executive management, financial
restructuring or operational efficiency are taken into
consideration.
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During the past decade, the number of activist
hedge funds across the globe has dramatically
increased, with total assets under management now
exceeding $100 billion. Since 2003 (and through May
2014), 275 new activist hedge funds were launched
(Preqin, 2014).
Recent academic studies suggest that, by and
large, activists are good for companies. An analysis of
around 2,000 interventions in America during 19942007 found not only that the share prices and
operating performance of the firms involved improved
over the five years after the intervention, but also that
the improvement was greatest towards the end of the
five-year period. The firms activists targeted tended to
be underperforming relative to their industry. These
results hold true for the two sorts of activism that tend
to be criticised most: actions designed to increase a
firm’s leverage, such as taking on more debt or using
cash to buy back shares, and actions that are
especially hostile to a firm’s current management
(Bebchuk et al., 2015).
Some corporate executives argue that
companies’ regulation provides too much power to the
shareholders and allows hedge funds to impose a lot
of pressure on the activity of the private firms. Groups
of experts appear who argue that regulation should be
changed however these ideas do not have support
among general public and regulators.
This paper will analyse the shareholder activism
development in the common law and civil law
countries and identify features of these legal systems
that create preconditions and obstacles for the
shareholder activism. For this purpose the paper is
divided into several parts. Literature review provides
background information on the issue as well as
indicates the points omitted in previous research on
shareholder activism. Parts 1 and 2 are devoted to the
shareholder activism in civil law system and provide
an analysis of the cases of two civil law countries:
Germany, as an example of a developed civil law
country, and Ukraine as an example of an emerging
civil law economy. Part 3 presents the analysis of
shareholder activism development in the common law
countries: the USA as an example of the country with
the developed shareholder activism and the UK as a
European country with the common law system. The
concluding part of the paper systematizes the main
outcomes of the research and outlines issues for future
investigations.
2 Literature Review
Scientific research on shareholder activism started in
the United States and was mostly focused on public
activism by institutional investors in the late 1990s.
Numerous studies have targeted institutional
shareholders as activists and connection between their
influence on the companies and financial performance
of the latter. Smith examined firm characteristics that
led to shareholder activism and analyzed the effects of

activism on target firm governance structure,
shareholder wealth, and operating performance. The
firm size and the level of institutional holdings were
found to be positively related to the probability of
being targeted (Smith, 1996). These results were
supported by Klein and Zur who examined activism
campaigns by hedge funds and other private investors.
The main parallels existing between the groups turned
out to be a significantly positive market reaction for
the target firm around the initial filing date,
significantly positive returns over the subsequent year,
and the activist's high success rate in achieving its
original objective. Further, it was found out that both
activists frequently gained board representation
through real or threatened proxy solicitations (Klein
and Zur, 2009).
On the other hand, Black surveyed corporate
governance activity by institutional investors in the
United States, and the empirical evidence on whether
that activity affected firm performance. He concluded
that institutions achieved little effect on firm
performance that way (Black, 1998).
A number of studies view the social aspect of the
shareholder activism. Guay et al. explored the role of
NGOs in shareholder activism and socially
responsible
investment
claiming
that
such
organization were the main supporters of the sociallyoriented shareholder activism (Guay et al., 2004).
Labor unions can also play an important role in
the shareholder activism. Schwab and Thomas argue
that labor unions are aggressively using their
ownership power to push corporate-governance
reforms. So far, much of their activity is tactical.
Lasting changes in corporate governance can occur if
unions develop a more strategic model of their role in
corporate governance. A strategic model would
require unions to concentrate on areas where their
interests coincide with other shareholders and where
they can demonstrate that their actions will increase
firm value. This requires that labor unions adopt a
platform of maximizing long-term growth for
shareholders and other stakeholders, as well as for
themselves. In particular, unions must convince other
shareholders that they are acting in areas where they
have an informational advantage about the
corporation's and management's operations. If labor
can demonstrate to other shareholders that it is using
its monitoring advantages to take actions to increase
firm value by policing management shirking and
reducing the agency costs of equity, then other
shareholders will be more willing to follow its lead in
future voting initiatives (Schwab and Thomas, 1998).
Despite the fact that a lot of studies cover
different aspects of shareholder activism or analyse its
influence on the target companies’ performance, only
a few papers take into account country-specific
aspects of the issue or consider the effect legal
systems have on it. Even less attention has been given
to comparative analysis of shareholder activism in
common and civil law systems. Girard presents a
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legal, theoretical and empirical study to understand
distinctive features of successful French shareholder
activism. Author’s results show that there is a
correlation between successful outcomes and the most
aggressive influential degree (law suit) with an
absence of private engagement. At the same time,
Girard points out a new tendency in the French
activism process due to the legal enforcement and
institutional changes. Contrary to the Anglo-Saxon
common law countries, the role played by investor
associations is a significant factor in successful
French activism. However, in accordance with a
global phenomenon, activist hedge funds and proxy
professionals are increasingly critical of bad corporate
governance (Girard, 2011). Another study performed
by Bessler, Drobetz and Holler examined shareholder
activism in Germany. The authors found that recent
regulatory changes in the German financial system
shifted corporate control activities from universal
banks to other capital market participants. Particularly
hedge funds took advantage of the situation by
acquiring stakes in weakly governed and less
profitable firms. Results suggest that aggressive hedge
funds attempt to expropriate the target firm’s
shareholders by exiting at temporarily increased share
prices (Bessler, Drobetz and Holler, 2015).
Judge et al., however, attempt to study
differences in common law and civil law countries
with regard to shareholder activism. An empirical
study of the matter suggests that (1) firm size is
unrelated to financial activism, but positively related
to social activism; (2) ownership concentration is
negatively related to both financial and social
activism; (3) and prior profitability is negatively
related to financial activism, but positively related to
social activism. These relationships in the case of
financial activism are generally stronger in common
law legal systems, whereas those in the case of social
activism are generally stronger in environments with a
greater level of income inequality (Judge et. al. 2010).
This paper does not reflect the results of an
empirical investigation but presents an overview of
the existing practices and regulations in the field of
shareholder activism in the common law and civil law
countries.
3 Shareholder Activism in Civil Law
System: the Case of Germany
3.1 Major forms of shareholder activism
in Europe

At the most assertive end of the spectrum is hedge
fund activism, when an investor seeks to effect
significant changes in corporation’s strategy.
Some of these activists have been engaged in
this type of activity for decades. In the 1980s, these
activists frequently sought the breakup of the
company – hence their frequent characterization as
“raiders.” They used their own money to get a large
block of shares and engage in a proxy contest for
control of directors.
In the 1990s, new funds expanded on the market
niche. These funds got money from other investors
and used minority board representation to influence
company’s strategy. While a company breakup was
one of the potential changes sought by activists, many
also sought new operational efficiencies, executive
management, or financial restructuring.
Modern tactics of today’s activists are evolving
and include both time-proven tactics and those that
fall within capital allocation strategy (e.g., return of
large amounts of cash to investors through stock
buybacks or dividends, revisions to the company’s
acquisition strategy). Many of them are spending time
talking to the company to negotiate around specific
changes to unlock value, before pursuing a proxy
contest or other more public activities. They may also
spend pre-announcement debates talking to some
other shareholders of the company to gauge
receptivity to their contemplated changes. These
activists are also grappling with the possible impact of
high-frequency traders on the identity of the
shareholder base that is eligible to vote on proxy
matters.
3.1.2 Shareholder proposal
Further down the spectrum is sponsorship of
shareholder proposals.
The goal of investors is to encourage one of the
types of change below:
– a change to the board’s policies or practices, or
a change to its composition;
– a change to the executive compensation plans
of the company;
– a change to the company’s oversight of audit,
risk management functions;
– a change to the company’s behavior as a
corporate citizen (e.g., environmental practices,
climate change or resource scarcity preparedness,
political spending or lobbying, labor practices).
3.1.3 “Vote no” campaign

Shareholder activism represents a spectrum of
activities by one or more of a publicly traded
company’s investors intended to bring about some
changes in corporation.
3.1.1 Hedge fund activism

Moving down activism forms are “vote no”
campaigns if an investor (their coalition) urges
shareholders to withhold their votes from director
candidates nominated by the board.
These campaigns usually fail to achieve an
involuntary ouster of a director since many companies
determine the results of the voting by a majority of
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outstanding shares – not just a majority of the votes
cast at the meeting. Nevertheless, when the challenged
director is not the corporation’s chair or CEO, such a
campaign can push the candidate to voluntarily
withdraw from the election. If the level of negative
vote was relatively significant, a director may be
replaced during his or her subsequent term
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015).
3.1.4 Say on pay
As a rule these activities are limited to letters to a
company (traditionally directed to the board
compensation committee) or meetings/calls with the
company (typically involving corporate secretary, the
company’s general counsel, or compensation
committee chair).
The goal of these conversations is to effect a
substantive change to the compensation scheme, or to
alter how it is described in shareholder
communications.
3.2 Shareholders activism in Europe: key
figures

activists, but today they have explored new territories
adjusting their tactics.
There are several specifics of the European
shareholder activism:
– a fragmented market: Europe is defined by a
myriad of local regulations, including EU directives
and national stock market rules;
– new exceptions to the rule: significant insider
ownership and cross-shareholdings have tended to
keep activist prominence subdued amongst large
companies. However, current exceptions include
Knight Vinke’s campaign at ENI (Italy), The
Children’s Investment Fund’s campaign at Airbus
(France) and Findim Holdings campaign at Telecom
Italia (Italy);
– equity landscape: some of European stock
markets are considered to be less liquid, which can
pose an innate hurdle to building a meaningful
undetected stake, and then, being able to exit a
position;
– a fertile economic environment: activity tends
to track the health of the stock market and, in turn, the
broader economy, which in Europe has generally
lagged behind the U.S. recovery, but is now seeing
emerging signs of renewed growth.

Historically, European market was recognized
structurally less attractive than the U.S. one for

Country
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

United Kingdom
France
Switzerland
Germany
Ireland
Netherlands
Italy
Finland
Belgium
Russia
Rest of Europe

No. of
campaigns
103
26
20
16
9
8
8
7
6
6
30

% of total
European
activity
43.1
10.9
8.4
6.7
3.8
3.3
3.3
2.9
2.5
2.5
12.6

Figure 1. Primary geographies for shareholder activism in Europe (2010–2014)
Source: J.P. Morgan European activism database, July 2014
While the jurisdictions have seen the most
activity, there are early indications that activists
alongside other investors are looking at Southern
Europe with increasing interest. Main activists in
Europe include the following:
– beyond location: while today most activist
hedge funds are headquartered in North America,
Europe is still a key regional investment focus,
targeted by 40% of activists when considering funds
that have either European or global investment flows;
– rising
investor
expectations:
the
aforementioned confluence of events, which has led to
more funds with more capital pursuing an activist

investment strategy, has resulted in increasing
pressure for activist funds to find specific
opportunities to generate returns their investors have
come to expect. This is considered to be fueling an
increased interest in Europe as fertile ground to
deploy capital with an activist strategy;
– the less travelled ground: 21% of all hedge
fund managers are located in Europe relative to the
15% of total funds that are based in this region,
signaling a potential under-representation of activist
hedge funds in Europe, which supports the
expectation that activity in Europe will rise
(J.P.Morgan, 2014).
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5%

8%

4%

14%
15%

41%

15%
66%
32%
North America

Europe

Asia Pacific

Rest of the world

North America
Asia Pacific
Rest of the world

Global
Europe

Figure 2. Regional location and focus of activist hedge funds
Source: Preqin Hedge Fund Analyst, 2014; J.P. Morgan European activism database, 2014
Shareholder activism in Europe includes the
following aspects:
– there are various attributes that attracts
activism, such as change in strategic direction, relative
underperformance, capital allocation, corporate
governance, balance sheets, and returns policies;
– governance-related
campaigns
often
misrepresent the motives particular activist

shareholders may have in waging a campaign against
the board of the company;
– approximately half the time, activists get what
they set out to achieve, but it is not an indicator of
whether their campaigns or initiatives lead to value
creation;
– only a limited number of activists targets
operational matters, and typically only they have
industry experience or particular insights.

Table 1. European activism campaigns by outcomes (2010–2013)

Governance
related

M&A
related

Balance
Sheet

Operational
improvement

Campaign objective
Gain board representation
Replace board members
Management remuneration
Change management

2010-2013
28%
12%
8%
3%

Sale of/Bid for the company

13%

Business portfolio optimization

11%

Other M&A

6%

Return capital to shareholders

6%

Capital raising/Restructuring

3%

General cost cutting

5%

Change in strategy/focus

4%

% of total campaigns
52%

30%

9%

9%

Source: J.P. Morgan European activism database, 2014
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3.3 The legislative road to a “say on pay”
in Germany
It took a few steps for the final enactment of the
current “say on pay” provision. The following
sections seek to give a short account of this process by
depicting the relevant stages on the road to a “say on
pay” in Germany.

sustainability and that remuneration is based on
measurable and predetermined performance criteria,
while termination flows must be subject to precisely
quantified limits and must not be a reward for failure.
Additionally, share-based remuneration policy should
be better linked to the long-term value creation and
performance of the firm.
3.3.3 The Act on the Disclosure of Management
Board Compensation-VorstOG (2005)

3.3.1 The German Corporate Governance Code
The Code puts forward significant statutory
regulations for listed stock companies and contains
the best standards for responsible governance in order
to make the German corporate governance system
understandable and transparent for local and
international investors.
According to Article 161 of the German Stock
Corporation Act, listed stock companies have to
declare whether or not they comply with the Code’s
recommendations annually, and if not, explain the
reasons for not doing so. While the initial version
suggested that the figures of the executive
compensation of the members of executive board
“should be individualized”, its revision in May 2003
turned this proposal into a recommendation and
outlined that compliance with it had to be publically
disclosed by the company. However, most
corporations rejected the recommendation and did not
disclose the compensation of executive directors on an
individualized basis. Instead, only the overall
compensation for the members of management board
was reported.
3.3.2 The EC Commission’s Recommendations of
2004 and 2009
The EC Commission’s Recommendation of 2004 sets
an appropriate scheme for the remuneration of
directors of the listed companies. Level and structure
of directors’ compensation are matters falling within
the competence of companies and their shareholders,
the EC Commission named some recommendations
applying to the listed companies:
– remuneration policy disclosure;
– recommendation concerning the disclosure of
individual directors’ remuneration;
– active participation of shareholders regarding
executive compensation.
In the wake of global financial crisis the EC
Commission changed some aspects of its initial
recommendation (December 2004) to take account of
false incentives in compensation schemes, which were
one of the most important reasons of financial crisis.
Thus, in its recommendation of April 2009 the
Commission extended the framework of 2004 mainly
with regard to the requirements on remuneration
policy of the corporation. The Commission’s
objective was to ensure that the structure of
compensation is in scope with company long-term

Following the European thrust, German law mandated
the individualized disclosure of remuneration of
executives for every listed company in the notes of its
financial statement or in its managerial reports for
business years beginning with January 1, 2006.
3.3.4 The Act on the Appropriateness of
Management Board Compensation-VorstAG
(2009)
The Act on the Appropriateness of Management
Board Compensation introduced several changes to
the German Stock Corporation Act. Their main focus
was especially targeted on the supervisory board
intending to reinforce its responsibility and role in
designing the system of executive compensation.
Moreover, the legislation was aimed at making the
compensation of executive directors more transparent
to shareholders and public.
3.3.5 Recent initiatives
On 8 May 2013 the German government announced
its intentions to alter Article 120 of the German Stock
Corporation Act. Seemingly influenced by the success
of a referendum concerning managers pay in
Switzerland, the German government offered to
prescribe a mandatory and binding annual shareholder
vote on executive remuneration system. It is
envisaged that shareholders must be informed of the
maximum amount of remuneration that executives
may claim under the respective compensation
schemes.
3.4 Hedge fund activism in Germany
The financial crisis had severe impact on hedge funds’
activity in Germany. The number of funds registered
and established under the German Investment Act fell
from 31 in 2009 to 20 as of September 2011
according to figures published by the German Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority.
3.4.1 Legislative trends on regulation of hedge
funds
German regulation of hedge funds has increased after
the financial crisis, with German regulation often
going beyond European standards or requirements.
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For example, Germany rushed ahead in May 2008
when the BaFin banned short sales in some companies
in financial sector. BaFin decrees in May 2010
extended a ban to naked short sales of debt securities
of Eurozone countries that are traded on German
stock exchanges in regulated market, as well as a ban
on CDS where the reference debt is from a Eurozone
country and which do not serve to hedge against the
risk of default. In July 2010 both BaFin decrees were
codified into statutory law under the Act on the
Prevention of Improper Securities and Derivatives
Transactions (URIA, 2012).
In March 2010, the BaFin offered the new
transparency regime governing net short-selling
positions in shares of certain financial sector issuers,
based on the requirements of the Committee of
European Securities Regulators for a pan-European
short-selling regime. The regime was extended to 25
March 2012 shortly before its expiry on 31 January
2011. The BaFin’s regime has since been expanded
and codified into statutory law under the Act on the
Prevention of Improper Securities and Derivatives
Transactions, with such rules becoming effective on
26 March 2012.
The rules of disclosure on stakebuilding were
widened under the German Risk Limitation Act
(2009). In order to prevent creeping acquisitions or
stakebuilding and to increase transparency, these rules
will be extended to apply to financial instruments. The
new rules are part of the Act on Strengthening
Investor Protection and Improving the Functionality
of the Capital Markets which was enacted in April
2011.
These legislative actions are expected to
decrease German hedge fund activity or at least to
refocus of activity on other classes of investments or
assets (e.g. foreign currencies, non-regulated financial
instruments).
3.4.2 Activism and behavioural trends
In general, hedge funds do not play a major role in
large German companies’ investments or in large
scale transactions. However, the most recent
exception was the takeover bid of Spanish ACS for
the German company Hochtief AG, in which hedge
funds acquired about 15% of shares and performed an
active role in rejecting and supporting the bid.
Over the last years there has been a direct trend
for activist hedge funds to invest in companies that are
midcap. In 2009 many funds invested in MDAXcompanies in Germany were considered as a tool to
influence corporate restructurings and strategy.
However, current shareholding structures in midcap
companies, which often have majority shareholders,
have made it difficult for the hedge funds to achieve
their goals.
Other longstanding hedge fund strategies remain
unchanged, e.g. seeking changes in the composition of
board members.

The most recent trend to emerge from
restructuring scenarios is for hedge funds, which have
a stake in the company to become lenders to that
corporation through acquiring bank loans or credit
claims, and then to push for restructuring. In February
2011, hedge funds with interests in German Conergy
AG pushed for a shareholder resolution on additional
capitalization allowing for a debt-for-equity swap of
their loan claims – a step which was without
precedent for a publicly listed company in the German
market.
In general, German hedge funds seem to
continue to act in the background and most of their
activities are not publicly disclosed: only about 10%
of hedge fund activities become public in the German
market.
4 Shareholder Activism in Civil Law
System: the Case of Ukraine
4.1 Corporate governance in Ukraine
Taking into account the fact that quite a few
enterprises choose joint stock form of capital
organization in Ukraine, the instance of growing
interest in corporate rights, corporate relations and
corporate governance improvement is considered a
positive tendency. Successful development of
corporate sector in Ukraine is closely related to
development of civilized corporate governance, and
improvement of the latter, in its turn, ensures reliable
protection of owner`s rights to national and foreign
investors, resources for further development – to
production, effective management of processes on
securities market – to the state.
Development of corporate governance in
Ukraine is provided by implementation of the Law of
Ukraine «On Joint Stock Companies», which
embodied world practice of corporate relations. An
important moment in implementation of innovations
of corporate governance, introduced by the Law of
Ukraine «On Joint Stock Companies», lies in bringing
the internal documents of joint stock company to
conformity with current legislation. With this aim
there is an urgent need of development of typical
articles of association of public and private joint stock
companies, regulations on corporate secretary,
regulations on information policy of a joint stock
company, etc. (OECD, 2003).
According to data provided by issuers, in 2013
compared to the previous year, the number of joint
stock companies which disclosed information on the
state of corporate governance as well as the number of
companies which held general shareholders meetings
has been decreasing. Detailed information on such
changes is shown in Table 2.
In 2013, among 5275 joint stock companies
which provided information on the state of corporate
governance there were 4834 joint stock companies
(92.64 %) which held general shareholders meetings,
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including unscheduled ones – 1622 (33.55 % of the
total number of joint stock companies which held
general shareholders meetings).
Control over the process of registration of
shareholders or their representatives for participation
in the last general shareholders meetings (if any),

which were held during 2013, in most cases was
performed by shareholders which own more than 10
percent as a whole (1420 joint stock companies or
26.92 % of the total number of joint stock companies
which submitted information on the state of corporate
governance in 2013).

Table 2. Main indices of the state of corporate governance of joint stock companies (OJSC and PJSC) in
2007 – 2013
Indices
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Number of companies which disclosed information
6091
6104
4936
6479
7784
7241
5275
on the state of corporate governance
Number of companies which held general meetings
5029
4996
4067
5006
7171
3681
4834
- including unscheduled ones
604
652
629
1844
2704
1243
1622
Authority which performed registration of shareholders for participation in the last general meeting
- mandate commission, appointed by the board
3664
3625
1555
–
–
–
–
- board
687
670
342
–
–
–
–
- independent registrar
1309
1341
2437
–
–
–
–
- register commission
–
–
–
3179
5952
5956
4414
- shareholders
–
–
–
325
420
288
205
- registrar
–
–
–
1354
697
331
–
- depositary
–
–
–
23
–
–
68
Number of companies which established revision
5406
5474
4379
4867
6369
5918
3222
commission
Number of representatives of shareholders which
own less than 10 percent of shares, in the
71.48
70.38
58.68
57.12
51.15
47.17
43.47
supervisory board (% of the total number of
representatives)
Periodicity of audits of joint stock companies conducted by external auditors during the last three years (% of the total
number of companies which disclosed information on periodicity of audits)
- not conducted at all
0.82
0.81
0.76
0.74
1.63
–
1.00
- less often than once a year
1.46
1.36
1.36
1.24
7.94
–
3.58
- once a year
86.20
86.73
87.09
87.03
82.94
–
87.65
- more often than once a year
11.52
11.07
10.79
10.98
7.48
–
7.78
Number of companies where revision commission
performed revision of financial and economic
activity of a joint stock company in the previous
58.25
58.41
57.96
57.11
59.26
–
58.35
year (% of the total number of joint stock
companies which indicated authority which
performed revision)
Number of companies which plan to include their
250
478
546
775
760
636
501
shares to the listing of stock exchanges
Number of companies which have their own code
66
75
82
145
524
640
677
(principles, rules) of corporate governance

Source: NSSMC, Ukraine
In most cases the committees of strategic
planning are established in the supervisory board (in
36.31 % of the total number of joint stock companies
which submitted information on the membership of
the supervisory board in 2013). At the same time, in
2013, 389 out of 5275 joint stock companies (7.34 %)
established special positions or units responsible for
relations with shareholders.
Besides, members of supervisory board receive
no remuneration in the majority of joint stock
companies (89.42 % of the total number of joint stock
companies which submitted information on the
assessment of the amount of remuneration to the
supervisory board members), and 10.05 % of joint
stock companies have established fixed remuneration.

According to the legislation of Ukraine the
executive body makes all the decisions on activities of
joint stock companies, except those which are within
the competence of the general shareholders meetings
and supervisory boards of companies. 32.36 % of
joint stock companies’ articles of association or
internal documents contain provision on the conflict
of interests (i.e. contradiction between personal
interests of the official or related persons and the duty
to act in the interest of a joint stock company) (VRU,
2003).
Among joint stock companies there is a
widespread practice to develop internal documents.
Most often additional regulation by internal
documents are needed by provisions on general
meeting of shareholders (21.99 %), provisions on the
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supervisory board (21.88 %), provisions on revision
commission (21.68 %) and provisions on the
executive body (board) (21.57 %). Among the most
non-transparent issues there is information on the
amount of remuneration of officials of a joint stock
company and information on shareholders which own
10 and more percent of equity capital.
4.2 Shareholder activism in Ukraine
Shareholder activism is not popular in Ukraine
compared to other European countries. Various forms
of activism (proxy battles, negotiations with
management and shareholder campaigns) are rarely
exercised due to uncoordinated and diversified actions
and interests of minority shareholders.
The major form of shareholder activism is
commenced through litigation. Shareholders can bring
claims to court in case of their rights’ and legitimate
interests’ violations, and Ukrainian law does not
stipulate derivative actions.
In accordance with Resolution of the Plenum of
the Supreme Court of Ukraine (from October 24,
2008, No. 13), the law does not stipulate the rights of
shareholders to apply to court for the protection of
rights or interests of a company beyond the
representation relations. The Supreme Court
recommended commercial courts to dismiss
shareholders’ cases related to the amendment,
execution, invalidation or cancellation of contracts if
there is no violation of corporate rights of
shareholders.
Additionally, Ukraine does not have special law
on remuneration. The JSC Law protects the interests
of a JSC from overpaying its directors by setting a
rule that the directors’ remuneration is at the exclusive
discretion of the council and should be set by this
organizational structure (VRU, 2008). According to
the Law, remuneration issues cannot be delegated to
other corporate bodies or officer, the only exception
being general meeting of shareholders, which can
resolve any corporate matter as the most powerful
body in the company.
Historically, informational disclosure of the
company to its shareholders was restricted. Only a
small number of majority shareholders had real access
to internal information of the company via the board
council. This situation changed when the JSC Law
was introduced and established some mandatory
levels of access to information on JSC activity.
Firstly, the council, the auditor or internal audit
commission and the board of directors must report to
the shareholders at least once a year at the annual
general meeting. Secondly, the JSC Law guarantees

free access for all shareholders to quite a broad
statutory list of documents on the activity of JSC.
These documents are obligatory provided to a
shareholder upon its written request. Thirdly, public
JSC must have an official website where required
public and statutory information is disclosed.
Fourthly, the JSC is obliged to have a corporate
secretary who is responsible for communications of
JSC with its shareholders. Finally, the Securities Law
and regulations established special disclosure
requirements related to a JSC’s information (SCSSM,
2003).
Considering past practices of corporate nontransparency and non-disclosure of information, even
if the disclosure was required by regulatory acts, there
is a reasonable possibility that some new disclosure
provisions of the JSC Law and the Securities Law
may be violated and that there may be lack
enforcement in practice by majority shareholders and
boards.
In addition, another important source of
information about the activities of the company is its
top management. Even despite the weak Ukrainian
law, which stipulates the equality of shareholders’
access to information and establishes the liability for
wrongful treatment of insider information, practically
controlling
shareholders
organize
unofficial
communications and meetings with management of
the company to get inside knowledge or keep in mind
all the company’s latest activities.
The JSC Law specifies terms of notice about
general shareholders’ meeting and information to be
included therein. This notice is sent to each
shareholder or to a nominal holder personally in
written not later than 30 days prior to the day of
general shareholders’ meeting and includes the
agenda thereof. Moreover, the JSC is obliged to
publish in the National Securities and Stock Market
Commission’s (NSSMC) official printed matter the
notice on general shareholders’ meeting. Any further
changes in this agenda should be brought to the
notice. Starting from the day of sending the notice to
the shareholders, a JSC must provide them with an
opportunity to become acquainted with all the
documents and information they may need in order to
make decisions at the general shareholders’ meeting.
Proxy solicitation is not typical for Ukrainian
practice as there are no special rules to regulate this
procedure. In most cases, proxy solicitation is
exercised by management of large public joint stock
companies with thousands of shareholders who do not
attend the general shareholders’ meeting for purposes
of voting.
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Table 3. Dynamics of individuals’ written requests from 2009 till 2013
Year
Central Office
2009
1686
2010
1292
2011
1295
2012
957
2013
1001
Source: NSSMC, Ukraine
4.3 Investors’
Ukraine

rights

protection

Regional Offices
4629
2217
2438
1526
2424
in

During 2013 NSSMC of Ukraine received 3425
written requests from individuals concerning
violations of their rights and legitimate interests on
the securities market. It is on 38 % more than during
2012.
Almost 78 % appeals were the complaints of
minority shareholders on the activity of joint stock
companies. Like in previous years typical violations
of shareholders’ rights remain the following:
– violation of the right to equal treatment to all
shareholders;
– violation of the right to participate in the
management of the company;
– violation of the right to receive information
about the activities of joint stock company;
– defaults on obligations under securities
foreseen by the conditions of their placement;
– violation of the rights of shareholders within
additional issuing (NCSSM, 2015).
Most part of complaints is letters from
individuals who have consigned property privatization
certificates, compensation certificates and cash to
financial intermediaries. Besides, the individuals are
not informed on activities and location of companies
because of the fact that most part of companies has
stopped activities of their representative offices in the
regions of Ukraine. Typical questions are as follows:
– none information on activities of companies
and impossibility to determinate their location for
many years;
– none dividends from the results of companies’
activities;
– nonconfidence in information on null profits
from business activities provided by companies and
impossibility to revise its reliability.
Individuals’ proposals and informational
requests constitute insignificant percent of general
number of requests. 98 % belong to complaints and
appeals of individuals.
Repeated appeals are 3,7 % of the total number
of appeals. Usually the main reason for repeated
appeals is insufficient understanding of securities laws
and the inability to carry out protection of rights and
legal interests in court.
In conclusion, the level of corporate governance
practices in Ukraine, although is not perfect, but is
under active development. It should be noted that the

Number of requests
6315
3509
3733
2483
3425

current domestic economic realities do not allow
explicitly adopt and replicate the experience of
developed countries in terms of corporate governance.
This is reasoned by the national features of business
and banking activity in Ukraine. Since Ukraine
became independent the track of the development and
reforms in the sphere of corporate governance
practices are clearly defined, and in addition during
this time many laws and regulations, adapted to
modern business environment, appeared, which have
formed a legal framework that promotes corporate
relations development. The study of corporate
governance practice in Ukrainian companies and
banks allows to summarize that there are no
significant differences in the level of development of
corporate standards, but due to the specificity of
banking activities, in particular in terms of risk
management, the banking sector is facing more
stringent regulation, including corporate governance
issues.
The importance of having the adequate corporate
governance system is connected with such key
element in decision-making processes of potential
investors as their interests’ protection. Business is the
game with its own rules, and these rules are
international. Ukrainian and foreign companies have
to deal with similar problems; tools developed abroad
can successfully be used in Ukrainian corporate
governance with national characteristics and changes
in standards of business conduct, albeit with some
delay, come into Ukrainian businesses.
5 Shareholder Activism in Common Law
System: the Case of the USA and the UK
Conflicts of interest and disagreement on strategy
development inevitably arise in any company.
However, intelligently chosen corporate governance
system can minimize and solve potential problems.
Types of corporate conflicts are determined by:
 legal environment, cultural and political
traditions in the country;
 ownership and control structure in the
company.
The legal environment with ineffective system of
minority shareholders rights protection has great
private benefits of control due to the fact that the
controlling owner has more control over the company
in favor of himself, ignoring the interests of other
shareholders. Empirical studies have found a
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significant negative relationship between the quality
of the shareholders' rights protection and the size of
private benefits of control (Dyck and Zingales, 2004).
At the same time in the countries with worse legal
protection of shareholders the market valuation of
companies with respect to their fundamental
indicators (assets, profits, reserves ratio, etc.) is lower
(La Porta, 2002).
Dispersal or concentration of ownership serve as
responses to the potential conflicts and, at the same
time, provide prerequisites by themselves to certain
types of conflicts. Thus, it is believed that in the
Anglo-Saxon countries, with a dispersed type of
ownership, the main conflict is a conflict between
shareholders and corporate governance system.
Minority shareholders due to the lack of coordination
are not able to control properly the managers who can
exploit it for personal gain. In continental Europe and
countries with emerging markets, which have
concentrated ownership structure, basic conflict
between majority and minority shareholders appears.
Some researchers believe that the concentration of
ownership in Europe is determined by political
traditions. For instance, European social democratic
values, in which social equality has priority over the
maximization of shareholder value, resulted to the
simultaneous strong influence of trade unions and the
high ownership concentration. The concentrated
ownership is the balance of trade unions influence and
vice versa.
A few years ago, empirical data suggested that
shareholder activism had no significant influence on
corporate governance in the USA, since shareholders
activism was a fairly rare phenomenon and led to an
extremely slight improvement of the companies’

objectives (Gillan and Skarks, 2007). The activists
were mainly institutional investors, which, although
have criticized imperfections in the corporate
governance practice, but try to avoid aggressive
actions against management. Recently, however, there
has formed a new category of activists in the USA specialized hedge funds, which use activism as one of
the main strategy to make profits.
In American and British corporate practice the
straightforward regulation of shareholder power is
intensified by a lot of other rules that indirectly block
shareholders from applying significant control over
corporate decision-making process. There are three
main control mechanisms, which are widely used in
the USA and the UK, such as:
 disclosure requirements regarding major
shareholders;
 voting procedure for shareholders and
communication rules. The comparison of voting rules
and practice of voting procedure in the USA and the
UK are presented in the table 4;
 insider trading and short swing profits rules.
This can influence shareholders in two different
ways. On the one hand, they disincline the
development of big stock blocks. On the other hand,
such mechanisms discourage communication and
connection among investors.
Various studies show that that shareholder
activism has significantly increased over the last
decade. According to the latest HFR Global Hedge
Fund Industry Report, total global hedge fund
industry capital rose to the 11th consecutive quarterly
record level in 2015 (HFR, 2015). Markets of the
USA and the UK are among leaders in such growth.

Table 4. Voting rules and practice of voting procedure in the USA and the UK
The USA
Regulations

Qualifying sponsor
Limits for the proposal
Quantity of proposals, which
can be submitted for one
meeting
Expenses covered by
Obligatory of resolution
Voting coalition
Voting system
Electronic vote
Do company release voting
results
Voter turnout
Source: Shareaction, 2013

SEC Rules
Ownership of 1 % of voting capital
(or minimum USD 2000 in market
value) for at least one year before the
annual meeting
No more than 500 words

The UK
The Companies Act (1985):
-section 376
-section 368
More than 5 % of voting capital, or
100 shareholders with no less than
GBP 100 per holder to call AGM
No more than 1000 words

One

More than one

Company
No
Hard to form
Proxy voting
Yes
Yes

Proposal sponsor
Yes
Easy
Proxy voting/show on hands
No
No

High

Low
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The development of shareholders activism,
predetermined by the US hedge funds, was picked up
in Europe, where it was strengthened by both overseas
and European funds. With regard to the goals and
methods, British activism is similar to the US one,
although there are some differences due to the fact
that European legislation specifies the framework for
a few different implementations of activism strategies.
For instance, in Great Britain, it is typically more
complicated for a minority shareholder to file a
lawsuit against the Board of Directors members, but
easier to nominate a representative to the Board of
Directors or to convene an extraordinary shareholders
meeting.
The US and British corporate governance
systems have enough similarities. They are realized
under Common law legal system, which have strong
minority shareholders protection in comparison with
Civil law system. Moreover, the USA and the UK
have a large market capitalization corresponding to
GDP, dispersal of ownership structure, developed
capital markets, and advanced sphere of M&A
operations. Another significant similarity is the
considerable equity stake, which is generally held by
corporate investors. Both American and British
corporate investors, who have more than 50% in
statutory capital, have been considered passive
(Mayer, 2001). Nevertheless, modern situation calls
for shareholders and minority shareholders in
particular, to gain more control over decision-making
process, which will help to increase firm profit. For
instance, large US pension funds such as CalPERs and
TIAA-CREF started their shareholder activism
program in the late 1980s. The Hermes Focus Fund
was established in 1998 as the first experiment of
shareholder activism in the UK (Teall, 1999).
British investors have enough mechanisms,
which they can use to influence on the decisionmaking process and strategy of company
development. The Stewardship Code in the UK,
which was presented by the Financial Reporting
Council, is a set of rules and recommendations for
institutional venture capitalists when investing in the
UK listed companies. Such practice implements a
“comply or explain” background and basically
forwards to companies who operate with assets on
behalf of institutional investors, such as pension
funds, investment companies and insurance
companies). The Stewardship Code suggests that
shareholders should provide fair instructions on time
and manner of activism expansion in accordance with
company`s strategy. The process is likely to begin
with basic debates on a confidential ground, in the
course of which shareholders may consider to
intensify their activism by using such mechanisms as:
(1) holding additional shareholders meetings with
directors; (2) discussing concerns with firm advisers;
(3) meeting with the Chief Executive Officer or
Chairman; (4) intervening together with other
institutions on the burning issues; (5) making a public

statement in advance of additional shareholder
meetings; (6) submitting resolutions and talking at
Annual general meetings; (7) requesting an Annual
general meeting, (8) and in some cases suggesting
directors to the board.
It is worthwhile noting that interdependence
between board of directors and active shareholders
and grows up dramatically. Both parties need to be
advised on problematic issues, and procedures of
public discussion of the issues which can greatly
affect the company’s reputation, primarily through
social media. Nowadays, the key goal for both
shareholders and directors is to set up and develop the
company’s strategy, which in turn will increase
financial ratios, company’s position on the market etc.
Shareholder activism in the UK has taken
considerable time to develop and become a part of
British practice. As reported by the law firm
Freshfields, aggressive US-style of shareholders
activism is still at the beginning stage of its evolution
in Europe in comparison with the USA. There have
been just 24 cases since 2012, of which eight were in
the UK. But, during 2012, activists intervened heavily
in what was called the “shareholder spring” the key
problems, which were under consideration, concerned
the issues of directors’ remuneration (Financial
Times, 2014).
The uprise of the shareholder activism in the
common law countries can be traced despite the
limited control instruments provided to the
shareholders by the legislation. However, even with
the limited opportunities shareholder activists in the
USA and the UK gain sufficient control over the
targeted companies and achieve their aims. These
aims may or may not (which is often the case)
correspond with the current plans and strategy of the
targeted companies. This brings new challenge to the
executives and board of directors. However, the issue
of protecting the company from shareholder activists
is not the subject of this study and may be developed
further in the next paper.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a comparative
analysis of shareholder activism development in
common law and civil law countries. The examined
data allows us to conclude that legal system is not the
dominant factor that drives shareholders to be more or
less active, for shareholder activism of every country
under discussion turns out to be determined by a set of
characteristics which includes the system of domestic
corporate regulation, development of the stock
market, companies’ capitalization, and corporate
governance traditions.
One of the most important issues with respect to
the shareholder activism in civil law Germany is
hedge funds activism. Examples of the targets of
modern activist hedge funds may include, but are not
limited to, return of large amounts of cash to investors
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through stock buybacks or dividends, revisions to the
company’s acquisition strategy etc. Despite the
difference in the legal systems, hedge funds activism
is also in the uprise in the USA and the UK.
Alongside with the aforementioned targets, activists in
the analysed common law countries also pursue such
aims as breakout of the companies, change of the
executive management, and increase in the
operational efficiency.
Small on-tier boards in the USA and the UK
provide the activist investors with the opportunity to
influence targeted companies having only one or two
seats on the board. However, the specifics of the civil
law model in Germany may raise difficulties in
effecting any changes with such a small representation
on the board. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
these differences are majorly provoked not by the
legal system background but by the models of
corporate governance.
German civil law model is quite advanced from
the point of view of the shareholders rights protection
and transparency of the companies. It combines
domestic regulations and recommendations and
European legislation which put forward significant
statutory regulations for listed stock companies and
contains standards for responsible governance that
allows shareholders to fulfill their interests in the
various forms of activism. This has brought Germany
to the 4th place in Europe by the level of activism,
after the UK, France and Switzerland. As for the
activity of the hedge funds, who are the most active
players with regard to the shareholder activism in
common law countries, German hedge funds seem to
continue to act in the background and most of their
activities are not publicly disclosed: only about 10%
of hedge fund activities become public in the German
market.
In the USA and the UK corporate regulation
indirectly blocks shareholders from exercising
significant control over corporate decision-making
process compared to the civil law Germany. Common
law legal system developed in the analysed countries
has strong minority shareholders protection in
comparison with civil law system. Moreover, the USA
and the UK have a large market capitalization
corresponding to GDP, dispersal of ownership
structure, developed capital markets, and advanced
sphere of M&A operations. Civil law legal system in
Germany together with the developed banking market
allows the corporate activists to gain concentrated
ownership stocks and force their stronger
representations on the boards of the targeted
companies.
Ukraine stands as an outsider in shareholder
activism. Being a civil law country but with the
undeveloped mechanisms of the corporate governance
it can not provide decent instruments for the activists
to pursue their aims. The positive tendency in the
development of the joint stock form of capital
organization in Ukraine that together with the

improvement of corporate rights, corporate relations
and corporate governance provide a solid foundation
to the development of the shareholder activism in this
civil law country. At the moment shareholder activism
is not popular in Ukraine compared to other European
countries. Various forms of activism (proxy battles,
negotiations with management and shareholder
campaigns) are rarely exercised due to uncoordinated
and diversified actions and interests of minority
shareholders. The major form of shareholder activism
is commenced through litigation. Shareholders can
bring claims to court in case of their rights’ and
legitimate interests’ violations, and Ukrainian law
does not stipulate derivative actions.
The development of shareholder activism in
Ukraine is well under way being fostered by the
favourable conditions of the civil law legal system
and halted by the underdeveloped mechanisms of the
corporate governance which fail to provide suitable
instruments for activists to pursue their aims.
Various forms of activism (proxy battles,
negotiations with management and shareholder
campaigns) are rarely exercised due to uncoordinated
and diversified actions and interests of minority
shareholders. The major form of shareholder activism
is commenced through litigation. Shareholders can
bring claims to court in case of their rights’ and
legitimate interests’ violations, and Ukrainian law
does not stipulate derivative actions.
However, the observable tendencies to the
improvement of corporate rights, corporate relations
and corporate governance provide a solid foundation
to the further development of the shareholder activism
in this civil law country.
Thus, we can conclude that shareholder activism
has many common characteristics in the analysed civil
law and common law countries. The main players,
their methods, aims and instruments appear similar.
Nevertheless, activists in the civil law countries
(Germany in particular) have more opportunities to
gain substantial control over the targeted companies
whereas activists in the USA and the UK achieve their
aims with comparatively small stocks of ownership
and board influence due to the legislative obstacles
and dispersed stock market. Shareholder activism has
strong preconditions for further development both in
the civil law and common law countries. Its
development, however, will vary depending on the
power provided to the shareholders by the regulations.
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